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1 Introduction
Organizational policies are largely shaped by managers’ life experiences, values, and beliefs.
When managers have their own subjective beliefs about the prospect of a new project, their
beliefs directly affect managerial decisions. In particular, in this paper, we study the effects of a
manager’s beliefs on incentive structures, which we believe is one of most important decisions
made by managers in organizations. For example, JackWelch, former CEO of General Electric,
has been known as an optimist, and also known for championing internal competition. Hewas
one of the most famous practitioner of forced ranking system.1 We believe that his optimism is
deeply related to his management style and incentive policies.
When a manager does not share her beliefs about contracting environment with workers,
what kinds of incentive schemes and compensation arrangements does she offer to the work-
ers? Are incentives provided collectively based on team performance or competitively based
on relative performance? How does a manager want to assign workers to tasks according to
her beliefs relative to the workers’?
To address these questions, we extend the standard moral hazard model in which a princi-
pal offers an incentive contract to agents. The likelihood that a task succeeds is determined not
only by agents’ unobservable effort, but also by their beliefs about a working environment. A
manager and agents assess the working environment differently, and thus have disagreement
on the likelihood that the tasks succeed. This is the key element of the model – the contracting
parties have their own subjective beliefs on the probability of success. Although they have dif-
ferent prior beliefs, they do not update their beliefs when they become aware of the difference.
They simply agree to disagree.2
When a principal contracts with a single agent, the principal with less optimistic outlook
provides higher-powered incentives. The principal with weak beliefs about the success of a
task expects that it is less likely to pay compensation even if she promises to give high-powered
incentives. When a principal interacts with two agents and offers an interdependent compen-
sation structure, the contractual outcomes are significantly different. The optimal incentive
contract follows relative performance evaluation (hereafter RPE) when a manager is rather op-
timistic, whereas joint performance evaluation (hereafter JPE) is preferred when a manager is
rather pessimistic.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. With two agents, the incentives can be
provided as a mix of two devices: compensation for joint performance and compensation for
relative performance. The principal’s optimal mix of the two is determined by balancing the
tradeoff between the principal’s relative price of the two and the agents’ relative responsive-
1See Welch (2003) and CNNMoney, “Internal competition at work: Worth the trouble?”, January 25, 2012. See
also CBS, “What is forced ranking?”, March 20, 2007.
2Studies that consider the heterogeneous beliefs include Harsanyi (1967), Morris (1995), Fang and Moscarin
(2005), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Goel and Thakor (2008), Van den Steen (2005, 2010), and Che and Kartik (2009)
among many others.
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ness to the two. The balance is in turn dependent on different beliefs among the contracting
parties. In particular, when a principal is more optimistic than her agents, she thinks that com-
pensation for joint performance is more likely to be made than the agents think. Conversely,
the agents think that compensation for relative performance is more likely to be received than
the principal thinks. As a result, a principal offers the RPE wage scheme. The opposite is true
when a principal is less optimistic than agents – a principal offers the JPE wage scheme.
We then examine a principal’s job assignment problem. We find that a principal prefers to
have the agents with different beliefs from herself for a task. This may explains why disagree-
ment is so commonly observed in organizations. Disagreement is naturally emerging from
organizational management such as project choice, recruiting, and job assignment.
There is a growing literature that examines the contractual outcomes when contracting
parties have their own subjective beliefs about market environment. The literature has been
largely concerned with the effects of the agent’s biased beliefs on contractual outcomes. Otto
(2014) and many empirical papers investigate the effects of the CEO’s optimism on executive
compensation. Several papers study the effects of different prior beliefs on incentive contracts
under moral hazard. In particular, Santos-Pinto (2008) and de la Rosa (2011) are closely related
to ours.
de la Rosa (2011) considers the case with one principal and one agent, and allows heteroge-
neous beliefs in two dimensions – an agent can overestimate the probability of success for any
given effort level and the marginal contribution of his effort to the probability of success. The
former is referred to as optimism, while the latter is referred to as overconfidence. He studies
the effects of each type of bias on the intensity of incentives, and explains when an equilibrium
contract entails higher or lower-powered incentives. Santos-Pinto (2008), on the other hand,
considers the approach of Mookherjee (1984) with a principal-multiple-agent model, and al-
lows agents to have mistaken beliefs about each other’s ability. He shows that an optimal
contract offers an interdependent incentive scheme. Like Santos-Pinto (2008), our focus is on
the multiple-agent case. But we take the simpler approach of Che and Yoo (2001) by which
JPE or RPE can be characterized formally, and show that the optimal incentive structure de-
pends on the direction of disagreement between principal and agents. In addition, we show
that the principal’s expected payment is not monotonic with the agents’ beliefs, and explore
implications about job assignments.
In this literature, it is assumed that the principal has an unbiased belief and offers a contract
that is able to exploit the agent’s biased beliefs. This paper, however, focuses on the implica-
tions of a principal’s beliefs on incentive policies. In this respect, the closest paper is Van den
Steen (2005). He considers that a manager can have an important influence on a firm’s behav-
ior by implementing a project generated by an employee. Our paper, however, considers a
manager’s choice of incentive policies when there exists moral hazard. The sorting outcome is
also largely different – in his model, strong managerial beliefs attract employees with similar
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beliefs, whereas managers want to assign workers with different beliefs in our model.
Our paper also makes a contribution to the literature that has studied the merits of JPE and
RPE (Green and Stocky 1983; Mookherjee 1984; Itoh 1991; Che and Yoo 2001; Kvaloy and Olsen
2006, Kim 2012; Fleckinger and Roux 2012). To the best of our knowledge, our model first
points out that different beliefs between contracting parties may determine the emergence of
JPE and RPE as an optimal incentive scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes the incentive contracts. We begin with the benchmark case in which a
manager contracts with one agent. Then, we study the two-agent case and present the main re-
sults. In Section 4, we extend the model by considering the manager’s effort selection problem,
continuous effort, and heterogeneous beliefs among agents. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider that a risk neutral manager (principal) employs a risk averse worker(s) (agents) to
perform a task. The outcome depends on the worker’s effort e 2 f0, 1g, which cannot be
observed by the manager as in a standard moral hazard model. The worker’s cost function is
given by C(e) = ce. That is, the worker’s supply of effort, e = 1, incurs a utility cost c, whereas
shirking, e = 0, does not incur such a cost. The model with binary effort simplifies the analysis,
but does not affect the qualitative nature of our results, as will be shown in Section 4.2. The
worker has an outside option which is given by u  0.
The outcome of the task can be either success or failure, x 2 fS, Fg, which is observable and
verifiable. For the task to be successfully accomplished, the worker should exert effort and
a working environment must be good as well. The manager and the worker have their own
subjective beliefs about the probability that the working environment is good: θm 2 (0, 1) and
θw 2 (0, 1), respectively. Thus, the manager’s perceived probability of success is pm(e) = θme
and the agent’s perceived probability of success is pw(e) = θwe. Alternatively, θm and θw can be
interpreted as each party’s subjective beliefs about the worker’s ability (marginal productivity
of effort).
A key element of our model is that the manager and the worker have differing prior beliefs.
They openly disagree about the working enviornment or the worker’s ability. As stressed in
the Introduction, they do not update their beliefs when they are confronted with someone who
holds different beliefs. This implies that each player believes that he is right and others are
wrong. In addition, each player is aware that other players believe the opposite.3 If this is not
the case, they update their beliefs when meeting someone with different beliefs, and so reach
agreement. That is, our model is reduced to the standard moral hazard model with a common
3As Harsanyi (1967) wrote "by the very nature of subjective probabilities, even if two individuals have exactly
the same information and are at exactly the same high level of intelligence, they may very well assign different
subjective probabilities to the very same events."
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prior (θm = θw).
We allow θm to be greater than or less than θw. When θm > θw, the manager is more
optimistic about the success of the task than the worker. When θm < θw, the manager is less
optimistic. Note that the workers share the symmetric beliefs. This assumption reflects the
fact that the workers are in the same situation and are more likely to build cognitive biases in
the same direction compared to the manager. In Section 4.3, however, we extend the model to
account for the case in which the workers are allowed to have heterogeneous beliefs.
The manager offers an incentive contract contingent on the outcome of the task. Thus,
when only one agent is considered, the contract stipulates two different transfers, v1  (vS, vF) 2
R2. The worker receives vS in the case of x = S and vF in the case of x = F. The risk averse
worker’s expected payoff is:
U(e) = pw(e)u(vS) + (1  pw(e))u(vF)  ce. (1)
with u0() > 0, u00() < 0, u(0) = 0 and u0(0) = ∞.
When the manager wants to hire two workers, i = 1, 2, the manager can confront four
different situations and offers a contract v2  (vSSi , vSFi , vFSi , vFFi ) 2 R4, where v
xixj
i represents a
transfer given to worker i in each situation, xi 2 fS, Fg and xj 2 fS, Fg. Both workers succeed
with probability pw(e1)pw(e2), worker 1 succeeds but worker 2 fails with pw(e1)(1  pw(e2)),
worker 2 succeeds but worker 1 fails with (1   pw(e1))pw(e2), and neither worker succeeds
with (1  pw(e1))(1  pw(e2)). We focus on the symmetric case. Worker i’s expected payoff is:
Ui(ei, ej) = pw(ei)pw(ej)u(vSS) + pw(ei)(1  pw(ej))u(vSF)
+(1  pw(ei))pw(ej)u(vFS) + (1  pw(ei))(1  pw(ej))u(vFF)  cei (2)
Following the literature, we will refer to v2 as joint performance evaluation if (vSS, vFS) >
(vSF, vFF) and as relative performance evaluation if (vSS, vFS) < (vSF, vFF). The inequality in-
dicates weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at least one component.
A worker’s effort generates positive externalities to his partner under JPE, while negative
externalities under RPE. For instance, when a worker succeeds in the task, his compensa-
tion is either vSS or vSF depending on whether his partner succeeds or fails. Hence, when
vSS > vSF, the partner’s good performance makes the worker better off. On the other hand,
when (vSS, vFS) = (vSF, vFF), it can be easily seen that Ui(ei, ej) is reduced to U(e). That is, the
compensation scheme is individual performance evaluation (hereafter IPE).
Finally, the manager’s payoff is revenue from the tasks net any payments made to the work-
ers. The task yields revenue RS if it succeeds, and revenue RF if it fails, where ∆R  RS   RF.
As in Grossman and Hart (1983), we will consider a two-stage problem – (i) the manager finds
the best wage scheme which minimizes the expected payment to the workers, given any effort
level, and (ii) the manager chooses the optimal level of effort which maximizes the expected
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payoff. In the beginning, we assume that ∆R is large enough. Hence, the manager always in-
duces the workers to supply effort so that we can focus on the cost minimization problem – the
manager’s objective is minimizing the expected payment to the workers based on her beliefs,
θm. We extend the analysis later to allow for the effort selection problem in Section 4.1.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, a manager offers a contract to
worker(s), who can accept or reject it. When two workers are considered, if one of the workers
rejects the offer, then the game is reduced to the one-worker case. In the second stage, if the
contract is accepted by both, the workers decide whether to work or not simultaneously. As a
result of effort, in the third stage, the outcome of the task is realized and the worker(s) receives
payments as stipulated in the contract.
3 Incentive policies and organization design
3.1 One worker
As a benchmark, we first consider the case with one worker.4 The manager’s perceived ex-
pected payment is pm(e)vS + (1  pm(e))vF. When the manager induces the worker’s effort
e = 1, the minimum payment contract solves:
min Ψ1  θmvS + (1  θm)vF
subject to
θw(u(vS)  u(vF))  c (3)
θwu(vS) + (1  θw)u(vF)  c  u (4)
The first constraint (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint that requires the worker to
exert effort, U(e = 1)  U(e = 0). As usual, if the worker is indifferent between work and
shirk, we assume that he prefers to work as a tie-breaking rule. It is intuitive that the higher
the worker’s beliefs, the less stringent the constraint is. That is, lower-powered incentives
u(vS)   u(vF) can induce the worker’s effort. The second constraint (4) is the participation
constraint which ensures that the worker is at least as well off with the contract as with the
outside option, U(e = 1)  u. The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract implementing effort entails:
 There exists eθm such that for every θm  eθm, vS and vF are charaterized by u0(vF)u0(vS) = θw/(1 θw)θm/(1 θm)
and θwu(vS)+ (1  θw)u(vF) = c+ u, and for every θm > eθm, u(vS) = cθw + u and u(vF) = u.
4Most papers look at the first-best outcome as a benchmark case; however, it is not our main interest. We want to
compare the one-agent case and the two-agent case in the presence of moral hazard. One can refer to Santos-Pinto
(2008) and de la Rosa (2012) to see the first-best outcome in a more general setup.
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Proof. In the appendix.
(Figure 1. Optimal Contract)
When θm  eθm, only the participation constraint (4) binds. As in Figure 1-(a), the op-
timal compensation can be found by comparing the slope of the isocost line and that of the
participation constraint:
1  θm
θm
=
(1  θw)
θw
u0(vF)
u0(vS)
=   dv
S
dvF

U(e=1)=u
. (5)
The isocost line is the locus of wage combinations along which the manager’s perceived ex-
pected payment is constant. The LHS of (5) is the slope of the isocost line, whereas the RHS
of (5) is the slope of the participation constraint. The slope of the isocost line describes the
manager’s perceived relative costs of success and failure-contingent wages according to her
own beliefs. The slope of the participation cost is the workers’s perceived relative benefits of
two types of wages.
In equilibrium, (5) demonstrates that the manager’s perceived relative costs of vS and vF are
equal to the worker’s perceived relative benefits of those. As the manager believes the success
of the task is less likely, she thinks that the expected payment is lower by offering more of the
success-contingent wage and less of the failure-contingent wage. This is the reason why the
incentive constraint is not binding. In addition, the manager with a more pessimistic outlook
is more willing to provide higher-powered incentives, i.e., vS/vF is decreasing in θm.
When θm becomes large, the incentive constraint (3) begins to bind as well. The optimal
compensation can be readily found by solving the two constraints. The optimal wage no longer
depends on the manager’s beliefs. In other words, when the manager is relativerly optimistic
and contracts with a single worker, the manager’s beliefs do not affect the incentive policies in
organization.
3.2 Two workers
We now turn to the case with two workers where the manager is able to offer an interde-
pendent wage scheme. The manager’s perceived expected payment to worker i = 1, 2 is
pm(ei)pm(ej)vSS+ pm(ei)(1  pm(ej))vSF+(1  pm(ei))pm(ej)vFS+(1  pm(ei))(1  pm(ej))vFF.
When the manager implements e = 1, the minimum payment contract for each worker solves:
minΨ2  θ2mvSS + θm(1  θm)

vSF + vFS

+ (1  θm)2vFF
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subject to
θ2w(u(v
SS)  u(vFS)) + θw(1  θw)(u(vSF)  u(vFF))  c (6)
θ2wu(v
SS) + θw(1  θw)u(vSF) + θw(1  θw)u(vFS) + (1  θw)2u(vFF)  c  u (7)
As in the one-worker case, the manager minimizes the expected payment to the work-
ers with two constraints: an incentive compatibility constraint and a participation constraint.
The incentive compatibility constraint (6) is derived from the Nash equilibrium condition i.e.,
Ui(ei = ej = 1)  Ui(ei = 0, ej = 1) for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. That is, in a Nash equilibrium, the
wages are provided enough for both workers to exert effort.5 Also, the participation constraint
(7) ensures each worker’s acceptance of the contract, i.e., Ui(ei = ej = 1)  u. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract implementing effort entails:
 For every θm and θw, vSS, vSF, vFS, and vFF are charaterized by
1  θm
θm
=
(1  θw)
θw
u0(vSF)
u0(vSS)
(8)
=
(1  θw)
θw
u0(vFF)
u0(vFS)
, (9)
θwu(vSS) + (1  θw)u(vSF) = u+ c
θw
, and (10)
θwu(vFS) + (1  θw)u(vFF) = u. (11)
Proof. In the appendix.
Since both (6) and (7) bind, they can be solved together and compactly rewritten as (10)
and (11). Indeed, the manager faces the two separate problems. She chooses the optimal
combination of vSS and vSF to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. She also chooses
the optimal combination of vFS and vFF to meet the participation constraint. As illustrated in
Figure 1-(b), when we set the slope of the isocost line to the slope of each constraint,
dvSS
dvSF

Ui(ei=ej=1)=Ui(ei=0,ej=1)
=
dvFS
dvFF

Ui(ei=ej=1)=u
,
we obtain (8) and (9).
5This incentive compatibility constraint does not exclude another Nash equilibrium inwhich both workers shirk.
In an earlier version of the paper, we studied the case where the supply of effort is the dominant-strategy. The
qualitative results are not changed. That is, the contract is robust to manipulative coordination by the workers.
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Corollary 3 The optimal contract shows:
 When θm > θw, the RPE scheme (vSS < vSF and vFS < vFF) is preferred.
 When θm = θw, the IPE scheme (vSS = vSF and vFS = vFF) is preferred.
 When θm < θw, the JPE scheme (vSS > vSF and vFS > vFF) is preferred.
In equilibrium, (8) and (9) demonstrate that themanager’s perceived relative costs of vSS(vFF)
and vSF(vFS) are equal to the worker’s perceived relative benefits of those. When there is no
disagreement among the contracting parties, i.e., θm = θw, the optimal compensation scheme
is individual performance evaluation. When the manager shares the common beliefs with
the workers, the manager does not offer an interdependent compensation structure because
it increases each worker’s risk exposure.6 However, the disagreement changes the optimal
compensation scheme in a significant way.
When the manager is more optimistic (θm > θw), her choice of incentive scheme is RPE.
The workers believe that they will receive vSF (vFF) relative to vSS (vFS) more frequently vis-
á-vis the manager. The reason is that the workers underestimate the probability of success in
the manager’s point of view. Knowing this fact, the manager finds it less costly to provide
RPE. On the other hand, when the manager underestimates the workers’ abilities relative to
the workers’ own beliefs (θm < θw), the workers expect to receive vSS (vFS) relative to vSF (vFF)
more often than the manager expects to pay. Hence, JPE is less costly to the manager.
Thess results show how organizational incentive structures can be shaped by managers’
beliefs and their disagreement with their employees. When CEOs or managers are more opti-
mistic relative to employees, our model predicts that they are more likely to promote internal
competition to incentivize workers. By contrast, when managers are more pessimistic, organi-
zations may provide team-based rewards.
3.3 Allocation of workers
We examine how the manager wants to allocate one or two workers among tasks depending
on the manager’s and the workers’ beliefs.7 For this, we consider two types of managers, θm 2
fθl , θhg , and suppose there is a continuum of workers who hold different beliefs θw 2 [θl , θh]
for a task. When θm = θl , the manager can contract with workers who hold stronger beliefs,
6Relating to this point, it is well-known in the literature that RPE is optimal when there exists a common shock
affecting both workers’ performance. In this case, RPE reduces each worker’s risk exposure by filtering out the
common shock.
7Alternatively, one may consider a situation in which workers have the choice between multiple managers as
in Van den Steen (2005). However, in our model, the participation constraint is binding, and thus the workers’
equilibrium payoffs are u regardless of their beliefs. This is the reason why we study the job assignment problem
for sorting in the labor market.
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whereas when θm = θh, the manager can contract with workers who hold weaker beliefs. For
analytical simplicity, we assume that θl is not too small.
When the manager interacts with a single worker, not surprisingly, the right person for the
task is the worker who holds the strongest beliefs θw = θh. This result is well established in
the literature and can be understood by investigating how the manager’s expected payment
changes with the workers’ beliefs. With a single worker, it can be shown that the manager’s
perceived expected payment is decreasing with the worker’s beliefs:
∂Ψ1
∂θw
=  (λ1 + λ2)(u(vS)  u(vF)) < 0. (12)
This is obtained by applying the envelope theorem to the manager’s minimization problem.
λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the incentive compatibility constraint (3)
and the participation constraint (4) respectively. Whether each constraint is binding or not, the
manager’s expected payment is decreasing in θw, because the manager can save a little bit of
u(vS)  u(vF). It immediately implies that the manager prefers to assign the worker with the
strongest beliefs to a task regardless of her own beliefs.
However, when the manager interacts with two workers, the manager’s decision for the al-
location of workers is not straightforward. The manager’s expected payment is not monotonic
with the workers’ beliefs. This can be understood in the following:
∂Ψ2
∂θw
=  λ1
h
u(vSS)  u(vSF) + c/θ2w
i
  λ2
h
u(vFS)  u(vFF)
i
. (13)
Again, λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straint (10) and the participation constraint (11). The sign of the above is determined by
whether the wage scheme is JPE or RPE. Under JPE, i.e., (vSS, vFS) > (vSF, vFF), the expected
payment is decreasing in θw. On the other hand, under RPE, i.e., (vSS, vFS) < (vSF, vFF), the
expected payment is increasing in θw unless it is not too small. Thus, the both types of bias can
be exploited by the manager.
The intuition is as follows. Recall that the manager dealing with two workers is now able
to create two types of incentives – one for joint performance and another for relative perfor-
mance. Disagreement creates a discrepancy between the manager’s relative price of the two
incentives and the workers’ relative responsiveness to the two incentives. The discrepancy
allows the manager to optimally mix the two incentives at a lower price. Suppose θm = θw.
The manager’s optimal contract is IPE, vSS = vSF and vFS = vFF. When θw becomes slightly
lower than θm, the manager can save a little bit of payment by reducing vSS and vFS, and then
offering RPE from her own perspective.
The discussion implies that the manager’s expected payment is hump-shaped in the work-
ers’ beliefs θw with a maximum at θw = θm. Thus, the manager wants to assign the workers
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with as different beliefs from herself as possible. Namely, when θm = θl , the manager allo-
cates the most optimistic workers to the tasks. When θm = θh, the manager allocates the least
optimistic workers to the tasks.
Proposition 4 When there is a continuum of workers who hold different beliefs θw 2 [θl , θh] for a task:
 In the one-worker case, the manager wants to assign the worker with the strongest beliefs θw = θh
regardless of θm 2 fθl , θhg .
 In the two-worker case, the manager with θm = θl wants to assign the workers with the strongest
beliefs θw = θh, while the manager with θm = θh prefers to assign the workers with the weakest
beliefs θw = θl .
Proof. In the appendix.
We can consider a continuum of mangers, θm 2 [θl , θh] . Intuitively, a manager’s selection
depends on how close θm to θh relative to θl . When amanager’s beliefs about a task is relatively
lower, she seeks to match with workers who have strong confidence. When amanager is rather
optimistic about a task, she prefers to match with workers with weak confidence instead.
The sorting outcome in our model is different from Van den Steen (2005) which shows that
the beliefs of a manager and employees are more aligned. Unlike Van den Steen (2005), our
model predicts heterogeneous matching. The principal can use the monetary incentives to
take advantage of disagreement in our model, whereas the agency problem is absent from his
model. In some sense, the difference is obvious and intuitive. When disagreement can be
handled in an advantageous way, a heterogeneous matching will prevail. On the other hand,
as in Van den Steen (2005), when agents are willing to work harder for firms that espouse a
vision they agree with, a homogeneous matching will occur.
Example. Suppose u = 0 and u(v) = v . The workers’ risk neutrality allows us to find
the principal’s expected payments to the workers in a closed form. As u(v) = v, both the
isocost line and the incentive compatibility constraint are linear, so that we must have a corner
solution with limited liability v2  0. With θm < θw, the JPE scheme is vSS = c/θ2w and
vSF = vFS = vFF = 0. The manager’s expected payment is Ψ2 = [θm/θw]
2 c. On the other
hand, with θm > θw, the RPE scheme is vSF = c/θw(1   θw) and vSS = vFS = vFF = 0.
The manager’s expected payment is Ψ2 = [θm(1  θm)/θw(1  θw)] c. The manager’s expected
payment with JPE is decreasing in θw, while with RPE it is increasing in θw as long as θw  1/2.
In this case, there exist bθm = θ2h/ θ2h + θl(1  θl) such that for every θm < bθm, the manager
wants to assign θw = θh, while for every θm > bθm, the manager prefers to assign θw = θl .
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4 Extensions
4.1 Effort selection
Here we investigate the manager’s effort selection problem to compete the analysis. We now
assume that ∆R is not sufficiently large:
∆R <
c
θw
+
u  u 1(u)
θm
. (14)
The manager may choose not to induce effort depending on parameter values. In particular,
we are interested in how the manager’s decision varies with the workers’ beliefs.
We restrict attention to a symmetric equilibrium, and then the optimal contract solves
max V  pm(e)RS + (1  pm(e)) RF
 
h
pm(e)2vSS + pm(e)(1  pm(e))

vSF + vFS

+ (1  pm(e))2vFF
i
subject to
e 2 argmaxbe Ui(be, e) (15)
Ui(e, e)  u (16)
We have already analyzed the case inwhich effort is implemented. Themanager’s expected
payoff for each worker is
V(e = 1) = θmRS + (1  θm) RF  Ψ2. (17)
The implementation of no effort is trivial. The contractual outcome simply requires the work-
ers’ utility to be the reservation wage: vS = 0 and vF = u 1(u) in the one-worker case, and
vSS = vSF = vFS = 0 and vFF = u 1(u) in the two-worker case.8 In both cases, the manager’s
expected payoff for each worker is
V(e = 0) = RF   u 1(u). (18)
Comparing the two (17) and (18), we get the following results.
Proposition 5 The manager’s decision to induce effort is as follows. There exist θw and θw such that
 for every θw > θw and θw < θw, the manager induces e = 1, and
8The one-worker case can be obtained by imposing additional constraints such as vS = vSS = vSF and vF =
vFS = vFF. In this case, there exists eθ < 1, where eθ = (∆R  u) θwc , such that when θw > eθ, the manager induces
e = 1. When θw < eθ, the manager induces e = 0.
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 for every θw 2

θw, θw

, the manager induces e = 0.
Proof. In the appendix.
Perhaps surprisingly, the manager chooses to induce effort from the workers not only with
relatively strong beliefs but with relatively weak beliefs. But effort is not induced when the
workers’ beliefs are intermediate. In fact, these results are immediate from the fact that the
manager’s expected payment is hump-shaped in the workers’ beliefs, as in (13).
4.2 Continuous effort
We now want to show that our main results are robust to continuous effort, e 2 [0, 1] . We
now consider a strictly convex cost function C(e) with lim
e!1
C(e) = ∞, and hence the second-
order conditions are satisfied. Each worker maximizes his utility, and we get the best response
function as
ei(ej) 2 argmaxbei Ui(bei, ej).
Given the incentive structure, the symmetric Nash equilibrium e = ei = ej is characterized by
θ2we

h
u(vSS)  u(vFS)
i
+ θw(1  θwe)
h
u(vSF)  u(vFF)
i
= C0(e),
which becomes the incentive compatiblity constraint for the manager’s contracting problem.
The participation constraint is written as
θ2w(e
)2u(vSS) + θwe(1  θwe)

u(vSF) + u(vFS)

+ (1  θwe)2u(vFF)  C(e)  u.
Two constraints can be solved together, and we obtain
θweu(vSS) + (1  θwe)u(vSF) = u+ C(e)  C0(e)e + C
0(e)
θw
(19)
θweu(vFS) + (1  θwe)u(vFF) = u+ C(e)  C0(e)e. (20)
Note that (19) and (20) are equivalent to (6) and (7) in the case of binary effort. The in-
centives for effort provision are given by the optimal combination of vSS and vSF, and the
participation is guaranteed by the optimal combination of vFS and vFF. One can easily see that
the rest of the analysis is no different from previous one. When the manager wants to induce
any given effort e from the workers, the minimum payment contract has to set the manager’s
perceived relative costs equal to the workers’ perceived relative benefits of vSF (vFF) and vSS
(vFS).
Proposition 6 When effort is continuous, the optimal contract entails:
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 Given any effort e, as θm R θw, we obtain vSS Q vSF and vFS Q vFF.
 vSS/vSF and vFS/vFF are decreasing with e with θm > θw, while vSS/vSF and vFS/vFF are
increasing with e with θm < θw.
The results about the manager’s choice of incentive structures do not change in the contin-
uous effort case. But it is hard to analyze the job assignment problem because the manager
wants to implement different levels of effort depending on the workers’ beliefs. We can show,
on the other hand, that the intensity of RPE and JPE are increasing with the effort level that the
manager wants to implement.
4.3 Heterogeneous beliefs
We now consider the case where the workers have asymmetric beliefs from each other. In this
case, it is more natural to interpret θw as the worker’s ability. As in Santos-pinto (2008), worker
i = 1, 2 has beliefs about his own ability but has another beliefs about worker j’s ability. Let
us denote by θii worker i’s beliefs about his own ability, and by θ
j
i worker’s i’s beliefs about
worker j’s ability. The premise “agree to disagree” applies not only between the manager and
the workers but also between the two workers.
When this information is observed by the manager, she can offer different wage v21 and v
2
2.
The minimum payment contract to worker i has to satisfy the two constraints, which are shown
to be reduced to
θ
j
iu(v
SS
i ) + (1  θ ji)u(vSFi )  u+
c
θii
(21)
θ
j
iu(v
FS
i ) + (1  θ ji)u(vFFi ) = u. (22)
From (21) and (22), we can see that the choice of JPE or RPE is determined by each worker’s
beliefs about the other worker’s ability relative to the manager’s beliefs. That is, when the
manager offers a contract to worker i, whether JPE or RPE is offered depends not on worker
i’s beliefs about his own ability, but on his beliefs about worker j’s ability. This leads to a
possibility that the manager offers the JPE wage scheme to one worker, while the RPE wage
scheme to another worker. For example, when θ ji < θm < θ
i
j, the incentive structures v
2
i for
worker i follows RPE, and v2j worker j follows JPE. Note that θ
i
i is in the RHS of the incentive
compatibility constraint (21). That is, although the worker’s beliefs about his own ability do
not affect whether the incentive scheme is JPE or RPE, they affect the intensity of incentives.
Proposition 7 When the workers have heterogenous beliefs,
 The optimal contract v2i offered to worker i follows RPE and JPE as θm is greater or smaller than
θ
j
i , where i = 1, 2, and i 6= j, respectively.
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 Consider the allocation problem of workers. When there is a continuum of workers who hold
different beliefs about his co-worker θ ji 2 [θl , θh] for a task, where i = 1, 2, and i 6= j, the manager
with θm = θl wants to assign the workers with the strongest beliefs about each other θ
j
i = θ
i
j = θh.
The manager with θm = θh wants to assign the workers with the weakest beliefs about each other
θ
j
i = θ
i
j = θl .
Santos-Pinto (2008) also looks at the case that the agents hold mistaken beliefs about their
co-workers while they have correct beliefs about their own abilities. In this setup, he shows
that the principal prefers to use an interdependent incentive scheme. Compared to this, we
are now able to show that the manager determines the incentive scheme between RPE or JPE
depending on whether her beliefs are greater or smaller than each worker’s beliefs about the
other worker’s ability.
5 Concluding remarks
This article studies an optimal contract design between a manager and multiple workers who
have different beliefs about working environments. A manager and workers evaluate con-
tracts according to their own beliefs, and hence a manager finds it worthwhile to offer an in-
terdependent incentive structure. This article provides a new rationale for the adoption of
joint performance evaluaton and relative performance evaluaton as a result of the difference
between managers’ and workers’ beliefs. We have further studied how a manager wants to
assign workers to jobs and show that disagreement emerges from managerial decisions.
There are several new empirical implications of our model that could serve as guides for
future empirical or experimental tests about managers’ choices of incentive structures. First,
when a manager is more (less) optimistic than workers, the optimal incentive structures are
relative (joint) performance evaluation. Second, a manager with strong beliefs is more likely to
match with workers with weak beliefs, and vice versa. Managers’ optimism is proxied by their
option exercise behavior in the literature of corporate finance. Quantitative measures of RPE
or JPE are not difficult to construct. For example, the magnitude of RPE can be measured by
the use of up-or-out promotion and forced ranking system, and that of JPE by the use of profit
sharing.
Previous empirical works have focused primarily on executive compensation for a CEO
as an agent in the principal-agent model when CEO’s optimism exists. We believe it is also
important how a CEO as a principal designs incentive structures for organizations according
to her optimism. In this line of research, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed
effects matter in the determination of corporate practices such as investment policy, financial
policy, R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures and so on. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2011) also study the effect of managers’ optimism about their firms’ future cash flows on equity
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financing. However, we are unaware of any empirical studies investgating the principal’s
incentive provision according to her beliefs.
Our model also suggests caution in the empirical analysis for the relationship between the
workers’ confidences and the intensity of incentives. Proposition 5 shows that the manager’s
effort selection is non-monotonic with the workers’ beliefs. In the binary effort case, the man-
ager does not induce effort from the workers when her beliefs are not much different from
the workers’. This result implies that the manager’s provision of incentives could be non-
monotonic with the workers’ confidences.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The Lagrangian of the problem is:
L = θmvS + (1  θm)vF
 λ1
h
θw(u(vS)  u(vF))  c
i
 λ2
h
θwu(vS) + (1  θw)u(vF)  c  u
i
. (23)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂vS
= θm   (λ1 + λ2)θwu0(vS) = 0, (24)
∂L
∂vF
= (1  θm) + (λ1θw   λ2(1  θw)) u0(vF) = 0, (25)
∂L
∂λ1
= θw(u(vS)  u(vF))  c  0, λ1 ∂L
∂λ1
= 0, (26)
∂L
∂λ2
= θwu(vS) + (1  θw)u(vF)  c  u  0, λ2 ∂L
∂λ2
= 0. (27)
When θw is large enough and thus λ1 = 0, (24) and (25) yield
u0(vF)
u0(vS)
=
θw/(1  θw)
θm/(1  θm) ,
which characterizes the solution together with the participation constraint. Thus, we must
have vS > vF > 0. However, as a fall in θw makes the incentive compatibility constraint bind,
we have λ1 > 0. In this case, solving (26) and (27) together, we get u
 
vS

= cθw + u and
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u
 
vF

= u. Hence, the cutoff eθm is characterized by
u0(u)
u0(c/θw + u)
=
θw/(1  θw)eθm/(1  eθm) .
Since the LHS is greater than 1 due to u0() < 0, we must have eθm < θw.
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3.
Using (10) and (11), the Lagrangian of the problem is written as
L = θ2mvSS + θm(1  θm)vSF + θm(1  θm)vFS + (1  θm)2vFF
 λ1

θwu(vSS) + (1  θw)u(vSF)  u  c
θw

 λ2
h
θwu(vFS) + (1  θw)u(vFF)  u
i
(28)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂vSS
= θm   λ1θwu0(vSS) = 0, (29)
∂L
∂vSF
= θm(1  θm)  λ1(1  θw)u0(vSF) = 0, (30)
∂L
∂vFS
= θm(1  θm)  λ2θwu0(vFS) = 0, (31)
∂L
∂vFF
= (1  θm)2   λ2(1  θw)u0(vFF) = 0, (32)
∂L
∂λ1
= θwu(vSS) + (1  θw)u(vSF)  u  c
θw
= 0, (33)
∂L
∂λ2
= θwu(vFS) + (1  θw)u(vFF)  u = 0. (34)
Note that the choice of vSS and vSF and that of vFS and vFF are separable. (29) and (30) can
be solved together, and we obtain (8). Likewise, (31) and (32) can be solved together, and we
obtain (9). Thus, as θm R θw, we must have u0(vSS) R u0(vSF) and u0(vFS) R u0(vFF). Since
u0() < 0, we can conclude that as θm R θw, vSS Q vSF and vFS Q vFF. The exact solutions of
equilibrium wages can be characterized by solving (8), (9), (33) and (34) together.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us first show that the effect of a change in θw on the manager’s expected payment. In the
one-worker case, by applying the envelope theorem to (23), we have
∂L
∂θw
=
∂Ψ1
∂θw
=  (λ1 + λ2)(u(vS)  u(vF)) < 0.
Thus, the manager’s expected payment to the worker is decreasing in θw. Thus, when there is
a continuum of workers θw 2 [θl , θh] for tasks, the manager always prefers to assign those with
the strongest beliefs to the tasks.
In the two-worker case, likewise, we apply the envelope theorem to (28), and get
∂L
∂θw
=
∂Ψ2
∂θw
=  λ1
h
u(vSS)  u(vSF) + c/θ2w
i
  λ2
h
u(vFS)  u(vFF)
i
.
Under JPE (vSS > vSF and vFS > vFF), the manager’s expected payment is decreasing in θw.
The analysis, however, becomes a bit complicated when the optimal wage scheme follows RPE
(vSS < vSF and vFS < vFF). When θw is small enough, we cannot determine the sign of
∂Ψ2
∂θw
. Since vSS/vSF and vFS/vFF is decreasing in θw from (23) and (28), there must be a cutoff θw
above which ∂Ψ
2
∂θw
> 0. When θl is not too small, we can conclude that under RPE, the manager’s
expected payment is increasing in θw. As a consequence, we have that as θm R θw, ∂Ψ
2
∂θw
R 0.
That is, the manager’s expected payment is hump-shaped in θw with a maximum at θw = θm.
From this analysis, it is clear that the manager with θm = θh prefers θw = θl , whereas, the
manager with θm = θl prefers θw = θh.
Proof of Proposition 5.
From (17) and (18), we have
V(e = 1) V(e = 0) = θm∆R Ψ2 + u 1(u).
Whether effort is induced or not depends onΨ2 is smaller or greater than θm∆R+ u 1(u). Since
θm = θw, the optimal contract follows IPE. Thus, Ψ2 = Ψ1 = θm (c/θw + u) + (1  θm)u =
(θm/θw) c+ u. Under the assumption (14), no effort is induced when θm = θw. Recall that Ψ2
has a maximum at θw = θm and is hump-shaped in θw. There must exist θw and θw such that
Ψ2(θw) = Ψ2(θw) = θm∆R+ u 1(u). 
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Proof of Proposition 6.
Given any effort e, we minimize the expected payment subject to (19) and (20). The La-
grangian of the problem is
L = (θme)2 vSS + θme(1  θme)

vSF + vFS

+ (1  θme)2vFF
 λ1

θweu(vSS) + (1  θwe)u(vSF)  u  C(e) + C0(e)e   C
0(e)
θw

 λ2
h
θweu(vFS) + (1  θwe)u(vFF)  u  C(e) + C0(e)e
i
.
The nature of the problem is no different from the binary effort case. Setting the slope of the
isocost line equal that of each constraint, we obtain:
1  θme
θme
=
(1  θwe)
θwe
u0(vSF)
u0(vSS)
=
(1  θwe)
θwe
u0(vFF)
u0(vFS)
.
The manager’s choice of JPE or RPE is, given any effort e, determined by θm R θw. Also, the
above equations can be rewritten as u
0(vSF)
u0(vSS) =
u0(vFF)
u0(vFS) =
θw(1 θme)
θm(1 θwe) . From this, it is immediate
that vSS/vSF and vFS/vFF are decreasing with e with θm > θw, while vSS/vSF and vFS/vFF are
increasing with e with θm < θw. 
Proof of Proposition 7.
The minimum payment contract to worker i is given by
min
v2i
∑
h
θmvSSi + θm(1  θm)vSFi + θm(1  θm)vFSi + (1  θm)2vFFi
i
subject to
θiiθ
j
i(u(v
SS
i )  u(vFSi )) + θii(1  θ ji)(u(vSFi )  u(vFFi ))  c (35)
θiiθ
j
iu(v
SS
i ) + θ
i
i(1  θ ji)u(vSFi ) + (1  θii)θ jiu(vFSi ) + (1  θii)(1  θ ji)u(vFFi )  c  u (36)
When (35) and (36) are solved together, the two constraints are reduced to (21) and (22). Fol-
lowing our previous analysis, we get
1  θm
θm
=
(1  θ ji)
θ
j
i
u0(vSF)
u0(vSS)
=
(1  θ ji)
θ
j
i
u0(vFF)
u0(vFS)
.
The results in Proposition 7 follow immediately. 
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